What\u27s in the Cards for the Future of Indian Gaming Law by Cooper, William Bennett, III
Volume 5 Issue 1 Article 8 
1998 
What's in the Cards for the Future of Indian Gaming Law 
William Bennett Cooper III 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, Gaming Law Commons, and the Indian 
and Aboriginal Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William B. Cooper III, What's in the Cards for the Future of Indian Gaming Law, 5 Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports 
L.J. 129 (1998). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol5/iss1/8 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. 
Comments
WHAT'S IN THE CARDS FOR THE FUTURE OF INDIAN
GAMING LAW?
"If there is one eternal verity which emerges from Indian law, his-
tory, and policy, it is that like little Alice [in Wonderland], we are
never certain of the 'Rules of Battle.' Consistently, the rules have
changed, often for reasons that have little to do with Indian con-
cerns or needs. "I
Chief Justice Rehnquist described the unique relationship be-
tween recognized Indian tribes and the United States government
as one involving "domestic dependent nations."2 While this status
affords particular rights and privileges exclusively to Indian popula-
tions and reservation law, the most publicized outcome of this sta-
tus has been the entry of Indian reservations into a great American
past-time: gambling.3 In 1979, the Seminole Tribe of Florida be-
came the first tribe to open a large scale bingo operation that has
blossomed into approximately one-third of 330 Indian reservations
presently conducting high stakes gambling.4 As tribes gained eco-
1. Rennard Strickland, The Absurd Ballet of American Indian Policy or American
Indian Struggling with Ape on a Tropical Landscape: An Afterword, 31 ME. L. REV. 213,
218 (1979-80).
2. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S.
505, 509 (1991). This terminology describing Indian tribes has transcended into
present day court analysis. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17-18
(1831). The Supreme Court has described the sovereignty and status of tribes as
unique and existing at the will of the Congress. See United States v. Wheeler, 435
U.S. 313, 327 (1978).
3. Gambling is now embedded in American culture. See William E. Horwitz,
Scope of Gaming Under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 After Rumsey v. Wil-
son: White Buffalo or Brown Cow?, 14 CARmozo ARTS & ENr. L.J. 153, 155-56 (1996).
Gambling in America dates back before the Revolutionary War when governments
used state lotteries as a source of state revenue to supplement tax bases. See id. at
156. Citizens and state legislatures both supported and renounced legalized gam-
bling throughout our nation's history. See id. at 156-57. The latest societal and
government trend supporting legalized gambling, stemming from the establish-
ment of Atlantic City and Las Vegas as bastions of gambling, has affected a funda-
mental change resulting in mainstream America accepting gambling. See id. at
157-58. In fact, state governments both allow and actively encourage gambling
through lotteries to promote state revenues. See id. at 158.
4. See Brian M. Greene, The Reservation Gambling Fury: Modern Indian Uprising
or Unfair Restraint on Tribal Sovereignty?, 10 BYUJ. PUB. L. 93, 93 (1996). Gambling
provides economic independence and power and is a financial windfall to the ma-
jority of the tribes that have entered the trade. See id.
(129)
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nomically, states questioned their role in regulating reservation
gambling.
The result of the tension between the states and the reserva-
tions was the passage of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA)
in 1988. 5 While state legislatures hoped the Act would settle the
rising tensions between the sovereignty of reservations and the au-
thority of the states, 6 IGRA sparked continuing controversy. Re-
cently, this controversy culminated in the Supreme Court ruling in
favor of state sovereignty in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.
7
This comment discusses various 1996 and 1997 court interpre-
tations of IGRA and also predicts what the future holds for the Act.
Section I discusses the passage of IGRA and the impact of Seminole
regarding interpretation of the Act.8 Section II examines recent
cases that have affected the interpretation of IGRA.9 Section III
discusses the social impact of IGRA and how economic success
under IGRA may not produce social harmony or societal advance-
ment for the tribes.10 Section IV discusses the future of IGRA and
the resulting impact on the tribes.11 This comment concludes with
5. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994). Congress included three objectives in pass-
ing IGRA: (1) promoting tribal economic development; (2) promoting tribal inde-
pendence; (3) promoting independent and stable tribal governments. See id.
§ 2702. While the Legislature's intentions were to promote tribal sovereignty and
economic independence, a corresponding objective was undoubtedly to relieve
the government from financially supporting the tribes.
6. See S. REP. No. 100-446, at 65 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071,
3073. "However, in the final analysis, it is the responsibility of the Congress, consis-
tent with its plenary power over Indian affairs, to balance competing policy inter-
ests and to adjust, where appropriate, the jurisdictional framework for regulation
of gaming on Indian lands." Id. The legislature intended to have the best of both
worlds with full authority given to both the reservation and the state.
7. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996) (5-4 decision). The Court struck down an IGRA
provision that allowed the tribes to sue in federal court if the state failed to negoti-
ate over gambling rights in good faith. See id. at 1133. The Court struck down this
provision as a violation of the Eleventh Amendment's sovereign immunity doctrine
and thus provided states with the upper hand in dealing with Indian gambling in
their jurisdiction. See id. However, Seminole renders state-tribal negotiations as
meaningless because the tribe has no recourse if the good faith requirement is not
met. See id. For a further discussion of Seminole, see infra notes 42-62 and accompa-
nying text. See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federal-
ism: The Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REv.
2213, 2244 (1996).
8. For a discussion of the legislative history of IGRA and the impact of the
Supreme Court's holding in Seminole, see infra notes 12-62 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of recent cases interpreting IGRA after the Court's hold-
ing in Seminole, see infta notes 63-126 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the social impact on the tribes as a result of the passage
of IGRA and gaming in general, see infra notes 127-70 and accompanying text.
11. For a discussion of the future of IGRA, see infra notes 171-93 and accom-
panying text.
[Vol. 5: p. 129
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INDIAN GAMING LAW
the suggestion that IGRA needs further interpretation and a re-bal-
ancing of power toward Indian sovereignty.
I. BACKGROUND
The passage of IGRA allowed Indian gaming the ability to ex-
pand under the permission and promotion of state and federal gov-
ernment. The Supreme Court's holding in Seminole impacted the
expansion and operation of Indian gaming by disabling the federal
government from requiring the state government to negotiate in
good faith with the tribes.
A. The Indian Gaming Reservation Act
1. Legislative History
Congress passed IGRA in the shadow of the Supreme Court's
holding in California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians.12 Cabazon
held that if a state allowed some forms of gambling, such as a lot-
tery, a tribe could engage in gambling activities without the threat
of state prohibition or punishment.1
3
As stated in the first section of IGRA, the purpose of the statute
is to promote tribal economic development and simultaneous self-
sufficiency.1 4 Additionally, IGRA was intended to protect the tribes
from organized crime and corruption, and to establish federal stan-
dards and authority.15 Legislative history reveals that states previ-
12. 480 U.S. 202 (1987). The California tribe attempted to run a bingo and
draw-poker casino on its reservation. See id. at 205. California responded by
threatening the tribe with state criminal prosecution under statutes regulating
bingo and poker card games. See id. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that
because the state operated a state lottery, horse racing and bingo, the games on
the reservation were not contrary to California's public policy. See id. at 210. On
this basis, the Court concluded that California gambling law was regulatory rather
than prohibitory and therefore the state could not assert jurisdiction over the gam-
bling operations. See id. at 213. For a further discussion of this holding, see
Greene, supra note 4, at 97-98.
13. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 202. The holding in Cabazon was an extension of the
earlier holding by a federal court in Seminole Tribe v. Butterworth, 658 F.2d 310 (For-
mer 5th Cir. Oct. 1981). In Buttenworth, the Seminole Tribe contracted for a lim-
ited partnership to build and operate the first reservation large-scale bingo
gambling hall. See id. at 311. The court held in favor of Seminole Tribe because
the state could not assert jurisdiction over the tribe's bingo operations under Flor-
ida law. See id. at 316. As was the case eight years earlier in Buttenrorth, the holding
in Cabazon rested on the conclusion that the gambling law of the particular state
was regulatory rather than prohibitory. Id.
14. 25 U.S.C. § 2702(1) (1994). The first section of policy declaration states:
"The purpose of this chapter is - (1) to provide a statutory basis for the operation
of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development,
self sufficiency, and strong tribal governments .... " Id.
15. Id. § 2702(2), (3). The purposes of the statute are further defined as:
1998]
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ously involved in promoting gaming strongly opposed IGRA.16 As a
result, IGRA was the compromise between states, the federal gov-
ernment, the tribes and the gaming industry. 17 Congress also con-
sidered the possible intrusion of the judiciary into this area as
another reason to balance the competing interests.18
2. Classes of Gaming Under IGRA
IGRA divides gambling into three classes that correspond with
different levels of state regulation. Class I gaming includes social
games for nominal prizes. 19 This class of gaming is within the ex-
clusive control of the tribes and is exempt from state control and
IGRA regulations or prohibitions.20
Class II gaming is more explicitly defined as including bingo,
cards and lotto.21 Congress also made clear which games are specif-
(2) to provide a statutory basis for the regulation of gaming by an Indian
tribe adequate to shield it from organized crime and other corrupting
influences, to ensure that the Indian tribe is the primary beneficiary of
the gaming operation, and to ensure that gaming is conducted fairly and
honestly by both the operator and players; and
(3) to declare that the establishment of independent Federal regulatory
authority for gaming on Indian lands, the establishment of Federal stan-
dards for gaming on Indian lands, and the establishment of a National
Indian Gaming Commission are necessary to meet congressional con-
cerns regarding gaming and to protect such gaming as a means of gener-
ating tribal revenue.
Id.
16. See S. REP. No. 100-446, at 65 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071,
3073. Congress was concerned that if reservations were allowed to run gambling
operations and were not forced to comply with state regulations, the result would
be an unfair competitive advantage against state gambling and result in a loss of
tax and income revenues. See id.
17. See id. Congress considered law enforcement concerns on reservations
and addressed the need to accommodate the differing public policy concerns gen-
erally held by the tribes. See id.
18. See id. This view of Indian regulation belonging to Congress and not the
judiciary is proper in light of previous decisions by the Supreme Court. In Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Court held that "Congress' authority over Indian mat-
ters is extraordinarily broad, and the role of courts in adjusting relations between
and among tribes and their members correspondingly restrained." 436 U.S. 49, 72
(1978).
19. See 25 U.S.C. § 2703(6) (1997). The statute specifically defines class I
gaming: "[t] he term 'class I gaming' means social games solely for prizes of mini-
mal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part
of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations." Id.
20. See id. § 2710(a) (1). The statute reads "[c]lass I gaming on Indian lands is
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Indian tribes and shall not be subject to the
provisions of this chapter." Id. The federal government determined that it is im-
portant for tribes to be free of regulation where traditional notions of tribal sover-
eignty are in question. See id.
21. See id. § 2703(7) (A). The statute defines class II gaming as:
[Vol. 5: p. 129
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ically not included in class II gaming.22 Class II gaming, while also
under the exclusive tribal jurisdiction and beyond state control,
23
differs from class I gaming in that the tribes that engage in gaming
must meet federal standards under IGRA. 24 However, tribes are
prohibited from freely using class II gaming funds.
25
(i) the game of chance commonly known as bingo (whether or not elec-
tronic, computer, or other technologic aids are used in connection
therewith)-
(1) which is played for prizes, including monetary prizes, with
cards bearing numbers or other designations,
(II) in which the holder of the card covers such numbers or desig-
nations when objects, similarly numbered or designated, are drawn
or electronically determined, and
(III) in which the game is won by the first person covering a previ-
ously designated arrangement of numbers or designations on such
cards, including (if played in the same location) pull-tabs, lotto,
punch boards, tip jars, instant bingo, and other games similar to
bingo, and
(ii) card games that -
(I) are explicitly authorized by the laws of the State, or
(II) are not explicitly prohibited by the laws of the State and are
played at any location in the State,
but only if such card games are played in conformity with those laws and
regulations (if any) of the State regarding hours or periods of operation
of such card games or limitations on or pot sizes in such card games.
Id.
22. See id. § 2703(7) (B). "The term 'class II gaming' does not include - (i) any
banking card games, including baccarat, chemin de fer, or blackjack (21), or (ii)
electronic or electromechanical facsimiles of any game of chance or slot machines
of any kind." Id. The statute continues in subsections (C) - (F) to further define
which card games in particular states are defined as class II gaming and the retro-
active nature of the statute. See id. § 2703(7) (C)-(F).
23. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(a) (2) (1994). While states cannot directly control
gambling that is run by Indians on the reservations, a state can prohibit class II
gaming if the state bans all gaming from its jurisdiction. See id. § 2710(b). IGRA
reads:
(1) An Indian tribe may engage in, or license and regulate, class II gam-
ing on Indian lands within such tribe's jurisdiction, if-
(A) such Indian gaming is located within a State that permits such
gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity (and
such gaming is not otherwise specifically prohibited on Indian lands
by Federal law), and
(B) the governing body of the Indian tribe adopts an ordinance or
resolution which is approved by the Chairman.
Id.
24. Id. § 2710(a)(2). IGRA reads "[a]ny class II gaming on Indian lands shall
continue to be within the jurisdiction of the Indian tribes, but shall be subject to
the provisions of this chapter." Id.
25. See id. § 2710(b) (2) (B). The statute reads:
(B) net revenues from any tribal gaming are not to be used for purposes
other than-
(i) to fund tribal government operations or programs;
(ii) to provide for the general welfare of the Indian tribe and its
members;
(iii) to promote tribal economic development;
1998]
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Class III gaming is defined under IGRA as simply "all forms of
gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming."2 6 For exam-
ple, all electronic versions of class II games are class III gaming.27
Further examples of class III gaming are types typically found in Las
Vegas and Atlantic City casinos, including slot machines, blackjack,
roulette, off-track betting and lotteries. 28 Regulation of class III
gaming is crucial because class III gaming provides the majority of
Indian gaming profits 29 and typically involves larger stakes that re-
quire closer regulation. 30 For a tribe to offer class III gaming, the
tribe must meet the proper authorization requirements under
IGRA and form a Tribal-State compact. 31 One author linked the
(iv) to donate to charitable organizations; or
(v) to help fund operations of government agencies.
Id. Additionally, if the tribe wishes to use the money to make per capita payments
to members of the tribe, the tribe may only do so if-
(A) the Indian tribe has prepared a plan to allocate revenues to uses
authorized by paragraph (2) (B);
(B) the plan is approved by the Secretary as adequate, particularly with
respect to uses described in clause (i) or (iii) of paragraph (2)(B);
(C) the interests of minors and other legally incompetent persons who
are entitled to receive any of the per capita payments are protected and
preserved and the per capita payments are disbursed to the parents or
legal guardian of such minors or legal incompetents in such amounts as
may be necessary for the health, education, or welfare, of the minor or
other legally incompetent person under a plan approved by the Secretary
and the governing body of the Indian tribe; and
(D) the per capita payments are subject to Federal taxation and tribes
notify members of such tax liability when payments are made.
Id. § 2710(b) (3).
26. Id. § 2703(8).
27. See Anthony J. Marks, Comment, A House of Cards: Has the Federal Govern-
ment Succeeded in Regulating Indian Gaming?, 17 Lov. L.A. ENT. LJ. 157, 167 (1996).
Any electronic version of bingo or lotto would be considered class III gaming. See
id.
28. See Karen S. McFadden, The Stakes Are Too High to Gamble Away Tribal Self-
Government, Self Sufficiency, and Economic Development When Amending the Indian Gam-
ing Regulatory Act, 21 J. CORP. L. 807, 812 (1996). See also Spokane Indian Tribe v.
United States, 972 F.2d 1090, 1092-94 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating IGRA class III gam-
ing includes lotteries and Pick-six game played on Spokane reservation); Michael
D. Cox, The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act: An Overview, 7 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 769,
775 (1995) (defining types of games falling under class III designation).
29. See Hearings on the Impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's Recent Decision in Semi-
nole Tribe v. Florida to the Senate Comm. on Indian Affairs, 104th Cong., 2nd Sess.
(1996) (statement of W. Ron Allen, President of National Congress of American
Indians). "Of total (Indian gaming) revenue (of $2.6 billion), Class III gaming
revenues represented the majority of dollars earned with... $2.16 billion in 1995."
Id.
30. See I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law-Update 1993, 15 HAsTINGS COMM.
& ENT. L.J. 93, 105 (1993).
31. With regard to class III gaming, IGRA provides that:
(1) Class III gaming activities shall be lawful on Indian lands only if such
activities are -
[Vol. 5: p. 129
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reason for the heightened standards for the class III gaming to the
adversarial relationship between gamblers and the house that is
unique to class III gambling.
32
3. Forming the Tribal-State Compact
For a state to allow a reservation to conduct class III gaming,
the state and the reservation must form a Tribal-State compact.
33
The compact is a specific agreement between the particular state
and the tribe that describes not only the types of games that the
state will permit in the casinos, but also the condition under which
casinos may operate the games.3 4 This requirement is significant
because, prior to IGRA, states had no authority over any manner of
gaming unless a tribe violated a state criminal or prohibitory gam-
bling law.3 5 Under IGRA, the Secretary of the Interior is assigned
(A) authorized by an ordinance or resolution that -
(i) is adopted by the governing body of the Indian tribe having ju-
risdiction over such lands,
(ii) meets the requirements of subsection (b) of this section, and
(iii) is approved by the Chairman,
(B) located in a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any
person, organization, or entity, and
(C) conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into
by the Indian tribe and the State under paragraph (3) that is in effect.
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (1994).
32. See Marks, supra note 27, at 168. Marks writes:
Class II and Class III gaming are differentiated based upon the player's
relationship with the house. The house does not care who wins or loses
when it operates Class II games; it merely regulates the operation of the
games and will make a profit as long as the games are played. In Class III
gaming, for example, blackjack, players play against the house; thus, the
house has an interest in who wins or loses.
Id. Thus, it is this interest in winning by the house, or in this case the reservation,
that could bring the prospect of interference and corruption through organized
crime. See id. at 165.
33. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (3) (A) (1994). The statute reads:
Any Indian tribe having jurisdiction over the Indian lands upon which a
class III gaming activity is being conducted, or is to be conducted, shall
request the State in which such lands are located to enter into negotia-
tions for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact governing
the conduct of gaming activities. Upon receiving such a request, the
State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such
a compact.
Id.
34. See id. For example, a compact might define games such as blackjack or
roulette that the reservation casino could lawfully operate. Any games a reserva-
tion casino operated not specifically defined in the compact would be illegal. See
id.
35. See McFadden, supra note 28, at 813. For a further discussion of the Indi-
ans' immunity from any state regulation of gaming prior to the adoption of IGRA,
see Oneida Tribe of Indians v. Wisconsin, 518 F. Supp. 712 (W.D. Wis. 1981) (holding
that Wisconsin's bingo laws were civil regulations and therefore Wisconsin had no
1998]
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to approve the Tribal-State compacts and has the discretion to dis-
approve the compact if it violates IGRA or any other federal laws.
36
In addition to the power vested in the Secretary of the Interior,
IGRA vests the federal district courts with jurisdiction over disputes
resulting from a state's refusal to negotiate a compact with a tribe in
good faith.37 IGRA places the burden of proof on the State to
prove that it negotiated with the Indian tribe in good faith.38 If a
jurisdiction over regulation of Indian gaming). See also California v. Cabazon Band
of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209 (1987) (holding that reservation bingo
games were not criminal acts and thus were immune from any state regulation by
California).
This type of immunity from the state in the gambling forum did not apply to
all Indian activities. For example, 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 granted
jurisdiction to Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon and Wisconsin
from the federal government over criminal acts committed on reservations. See
also The Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1994) (allowing state courts to
apply state criminal laws to crimes committed by non-Indians on Indian lands).
36. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(8)(A)-(C) (1994) reads:
(A) The Secretary is authorized to approve any Tribal-State Compact en-
tered into between an Indian Tribe and a State governing gaming on
Indian lands of such Indian tribe.
(B) The Secretary may disapprove a compact described in subparagraph
(A) only if such compact violates -
(i) any provision of this chapter
(ii) any other provision of Federal law that does not relate to juris-
diction over gaming on Indian land, or
(iii) the trust obligations of the United States to Indians.
(C) If the Secretary does not approve or disapprove a compact described
in subparagraph (A) before the date that is 45 days after the date on
which the compact is submitted to the Secretary for approval, the com-
pact shall be considered to have been approved by the Secretary, but only
to the extent the compact is consistent with the provisions of this chapter.
Id.
37. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7) (A) reads:
(A) The United States district courts shall have jurisdiction over -
(i) any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the
failure of a State to enter into negotiations with the Indian tribe for
the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact under para-
graph (3) or to conduct such negotiations in good faith,
(ii) any cause of action initiated by a State or Indian tribe to enjoin
a class III gaming activity located on Indian lands and conducted in
violation of any Tribal-State compact entered into under paragraph
(3) that is in effect, and
(iii) any cause of action initiated by the Secretary to enforce the pro-
cedures prescribed under subparagraph (B) (vii).
Id.
38. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7) (B) (ii) reads:
(ii) In any action described in subparagraph (A) (i), upon the introduc-
tion of evidence by an Indian tribe that -
(I) a Tribal-State compact has not been entered into under the par-
agraph (3), and
(II) the state did not respond to the request of the Indian tribe to
negotiate such a compact or did not respond to such request in good
faith, the burden of proof shall be upon the State to prove that the
[Vol. 5: p. 129
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court finds an absence of good faith negotiations between the tribe
and State, the statute instructs the court to order that a concluded
compact be reached in sixty days.39 If the State and tribe then fail
to enter into a compact within sixty days, the parties must submit
their offers to a court-appointed mediator who selects the best com-
pact under IGRA and federal laws.40 If the State fails to consent to
the selected compact within the following sixty day period, the Sec-
retary of the Interior assumes the role of the State and prescribes
the procedures under which the class III gaming will be
conducted.
4 1
State has negotiated with the Indian tribe in good faith to conclude a
Tribal-State compact governing the conduct of gaming activities.
Id.
39. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7) (B) (iii) reads:
If, in any action described in subparagraph (A)(i), the court finds the
State has failed to negotiate in good faith with the Indian tribe to con-
clude a Tibal-State compact governing the conduct of the gaming activi-
ties, the court shall order the State and the Indian Tribe to conclude such
a compact within a 60-day period. In determining in such an action
whether a State has negotiated in good faith, the court -
(I) may take into account the public interest, public safety, crimi-
nality, financial integrity, and adverse economic impacts on existing
gaming activities, and
(II) shall consider any demand by the State for direct taxation of the
Indian tribe or of any Indian lands as evidence that the State has not
negotiated in good faith.
Id.
40. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7) (B) (iv) reads:
(iv) If a State and an Indian tribe fail to conclude a Tribal-State compact
governing the conduct of the gaming activities on the Indian lands sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of such Indian tribe within the 60-day period pro-
vided in the order of a court issued under clause (iii), the Indian tribe
and the State shall each submit to a mediator appointed by the court a
proposed compact that represents their last best offer for a compact. The
mediator shall select from the two proposed compacts the one which best
comports with the terms of this chapter and any other applicable Federal
law and with the findings and order of the court.
(v) The mediator appointed by the court under clause (iv) shall submit
to the State and the Indian tribe the compact selected by the mediator
under clause (iv).
Id.
41. See id. It is this assumption of state power by the Secretary of the Interior
that the states challenged. By allowing a federal official rather than a state gover-
nor or other state official to negotiate with the tribes, the federal government
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B. Seminole Tribe v. Florida
In 1996, the Supreme Court held that sections of IGRA vio-
lated states' Eleventh Amendment immunity42 by authorizing In-
dian tribes to enforce and compel Tribal-State compacts. 4 3 In
September 1991, the Seminole Tribe sued the State of Florida and
alleged that the state had refused to enter into negotiations for
inclusion of gaming activities in a Tribal-State compact in violation
of the good faith negotiation requirement in 25 U.S.C. § 2710
(d) (3). 4 4 The district court denied the State's motion to dismiss,
but on interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit reversed the district court's holding that the Eleventh
Amendment barred the tribe's suit against Florida.45 The Eleventh
Circuit held that Congress did not have the power to abrogate a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit and therefore
concluded that there was no jurisdiction over the tribe's suit against
Florida.46 Additionally, the circuit court relied on Ex parte Young,
4 7
42. The Eleventh Amendment provides: "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by
Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONsT. amend. XI.
Herbert Hovenkamp writes that the text of the Eleventh Amendment can be
interpreted in four possible ways:
1. The Amendment barred diversity actions brought by a citizen of one
state against another state.
2. The Amendment (plus any penumbra) barred both diversity actions
and federal question actions by a citizen of one state against another
state, unless Congress made clear that the federal statute at issue was
designed to abrogate state sovereign immunity.
3. The Amendment (plus any penumbra) barred both diversity actions
and federal question actions by any citizen against any state, includ-
ing the citizen's own state, unless Congress made clear that the fed-
eral statute at issue was designed to abrogate state sovereign
immunity.
4. The Amendment (plus any penumbra) barred both diversity actions
and federal question actions by any citizen against any state, includ-
ing the citizen's own state, and the immunity may not be abrogated
by a congressional act.
Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 2239.
43. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).
44. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 801 F. Supp. 655, 656 (S.D. Fla. 1992), rev'd,
11 F.3d 1016 (l1th Cir. 1994). The respondents moved to dismiss the claim argu-
ing that the suit violated a state's sovereign immunity from suit in a federal court.
See id.
45. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016 (11th Cir. 1994). The circuit
court agreed that the Act had been passed pursuant to Congress' power under the
Indian Commerce Clause. See id.
46. See id. at 1019.
47. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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and found that an Indian tribe is not permitted to compel good
faith negotiations by suing the governor of a state.
48
The Seminole Tribe appealed two issues to the Supreme
Court.4 9 First, did the Eleventh Amendment prevent Congress
from passing legislation authorizing Indian tribes to sue states in
federal courts?5 0 Second, did the doctrine of Ex parte Young permit
Indian tribes to bring suits against state governors to enforce
IGRA's good faith bargaining requirement?51 The Court held that
the Eleventh Amendment precluded Congress from authorizing
suits by Indian tribes against the states; that Ex parte Young pre-
cluded suit against the Governor of Florida; and held that, due to a
lack of jurisdiction, the suit was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.
52
The majority opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
overruled the plurality opinion in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.
53
and re-instituted the concept of state sovereignty under the direc-
tion and authority of the Eleventh Amendment. In holding that a
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity may not be abrogated by
congressional acts, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that the Eleventh
Amendment is significant "not so much for what it says, but for the
presupposition . . .which it confirms. ' 54 Thus, despite Congress'
48. See Seminole, 11 F.3d at 1028. The court found that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction and remanded the case to the district court with directions to dismiss
the Tribe's suit. See id. at 1030.
49. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 1133. The Court further stated in its holding that:
[W]e have found that Congress does not have authority under the Consti-
tution to make the State suable in federal court under § 2710(d)(7).
Nevertheless, the fact that Congress chose to impose upon the State a
liability which is significantly more limited than would be the liability im-
posed upon the state officer under Ex parte Young strongly indicates that
Congress had no wish to create the latter under § 2710(d) (3). Nor are
we free to rewrite the statutory scheme in order to approximate what we
think Congress might have wanted had it known that § 2710(d) (7) was
beyond its authority. If that effort is to be made, it should be made by
Congress, and not by the federal courts.
Id.
53. 491 U.S. 1 (1989) (finding that Interstate Commerce Clause granted Con-
gress authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity). For a further discussion of
Union Gas Co., see Pat Smith, Point: Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, A Victoy
For States' Rights; Indian Gaming Act Caught In the Crossfire, MoNT. LAW., July-Aug.
1996, at 21, 23 (stating subsequent appointments to Court were seen by minority
in Union Gas Co. as opportunity to reverse decision that interfered with states'
rights).
54. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1122 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Village of
Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (omission in original)).
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specific intent under IGRA to subject state Indian suits to federal
courts, Congress simply lacked the authority to abrogate the states'
immunity.
55
The Court additionally held that plaintiffs can not bring suits
under IGRA against state officers, rather than the state itself.5 6 The
Supreme Court held, in Ex parte Young, that when state law is vio-
lated by a public official, the state officer is "stripped of his official
or representative character and is subjected in his person to the
consequences of his individual conduct. The state has no power to
impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme au-
thority of the United States."57 Thus, while Congress can impede
on state's rights to uphold federal and constitutional laws, acts that
are purely discretionary are outside of this Eleventh Amendment
exception. 58 However, the Supreme Court held that the present
situation was different than Ex parte Young because the state gover-
nor is forced to negotiate with a tribe and has no real discretion
under IGRA.59 Additionally, the Court concluded that when there
is a remedial scheme of enforcement of a particular right, the
courts have refused to consider Ex parte Young in addition to that
particular right.60 Under IGRA, the remedial scheme preventing
the court from applying Ex parte Young existed in 25 U.S.C.
55. The dissent sharply disagreed with the majority's view of federalism. See
id. at 1134. Justice Stevens characterized Rehnquist and the majority's view as
"profoundly misguided" and wrote:
The majority's opinion does not simply preclude Congress from es-
tablishing the rather curious statutory scheme under which Indian tribes
may seek the aid of a federal court to secure a State's good faith negotia-
tions over gaming regulations. Rather, it prevents Congress from provid-
ing a federal forum for a broad range of actions against States, from those
sounding in copyright and patent law, to those concerning bankruptcy,
environmental law, and the regulation of our vast national economy.
Id.
56. See id. at 1132. Relying upon Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the
Seminole Tribe contended that they could bring an action against a state official
for failing to comply with IGRA, instead of suing the state directly. See Seminole, 116
S. Ct. at 1132.
57. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 160.
58. For a further discussion of this Eleventh Amendment exception and its
relation to Indian gaming, see Keith D. Bilezerian, Ante Up or Fold: States Attempt to
Play Their Hand While Indian Casinos Cash In, 29 NEw ENG. L. REv. 463, 483-91
(1995).
59. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1133. The majority noted that in comparison to
Ex parte Young, IGRA contained only a modest set of sanctions against state offi-
cials. See id. In Ex parte Young, a state official was exposed to the full remedial
powers of the court. See id.
60. See id. The Court also noted that when Congress has provided adequate
remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations, the Court has refused to create
additional remedies. See id. (citing Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 423
(1988)).
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§§ 2710(d) (3), (7).61 The Court concluded by holding that Exparte
Young is inapplicable to petitioner's suit against the Governor of
Florida and therefore is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and
dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction.
62
II. SIGNIFICANT INDIAN GAMING DECISIONS AFTER SEMINOLE
Following the Seminole decision, Indian tribes filed numerous
suits attempting to increase their ability to participate in gaming. 63
As evidenced in the following cases, the result has been virtually a
unanimous move, at both the district and circuit court levels, to
further limit the ability of tribes to engage in gambling or expand
existing casinos.
A. Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the domi-
nance of the state over Indian gaming and invalidated the compacts
under which a tribe in New Mexico was operating class III gaming
in Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly.64 In New Mexico, Indian gaming was
such a controversial topic that the Governor's election centered on
how New Mexico would handle tribal gambling. 65 In the new Gov-
Relying on this precedent in Seminole, the Court held that because Congress
prescribed a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement of a statutorily created
right against a state, a court should hesitate before ignoring the limitations and
permit an action against a state officer under Ex parte Young. Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at
1132.
61. For the language of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (3), see supra note 33. For the
language of 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (7), see supra notes 37-41. One example of the
intricate remedial scheme in IGRA referenced by the Court is the 60 day period
given for a state and tribe to negotiate a compact where the state has previously
failed to negotiate in good faith. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1132. For a further
discussion of IGRA's remedial measures, see supra note 31.
62. See Seminole, 116 S. Ct. at 1133.
63. See Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding
Secretary of Interior could not revive invalid Tribal-State compact); New York v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 90 F.3d 58, 59 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding against tribe and
directing alleged violation of compact to court rather than arbitration); Crow
Tribe of Indians v. Racicot, 87 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding state may in-
trude and conduct search and seizure on Indian gaming operations); Miami Tribe
v. United States, 927 F. Supp. 1419 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding bingo facility could
not be constructed because land was not Indian land). For a discussion of Kelly,
see infra notes 64-84 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Oneida, see infra
notes 85-93 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Crow, see infra notes 94-
114 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Miami Tribe, see infra notes 115-26
and accompanying text.
64. 104 F.3d 1546 (10th Cir. 1997).
65. See id. at 1550. The court wrote in dicta that Indian gaming was a signifi-
cant campaign issue in the 1994 gubernatorial campaign and that the incumbent
was defeated by GaryJohnson because Johnson had publicly committed to signing
19981
13
Cooper: What's in the Cards for the Future of Indian Gaming Law
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
142 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENr. LAw JOURNAL
ernor's first year in office, thirteen tribal compacts took effect. 66
Relying on these assurances by state and federal officials, many of
the tribes in New Mexico spent vast sums of money improving or
constructing new casinos.
67
Two cases decided by the New Mexico Supreme Court severely
impacted the status of Indian gaming in New Mexico. First, in New
Mexico ex rel v. Johnson,68 the court ruled that the Governor lacked
the authority to sign Tribal-State compacts on behalf of New Mex-
ico. The court held that the Governor's proper role was not the
creation, but the execution, of the law. 69 After examining the virtu-
Tribal-State compacts if elected governor. See id. This same election witnessed
voter approval of a constitutional amendment authorizing a state lottery and legal-
izing video gambling. See id.
66. See id. GovernorJohnson appointed Professor Fred Ragsdale to negotiate
compacts with thirteen Indian tribes, and on February 13, 1995,Johnson signed 13
identical compacts. See id. In March and April, the Secretary of the Interior ap-
proved all 13 of the compacts and published the approval notice in the Federal
Register. See id. The tribes received letters from the defendant that stated:
The execution, approval and publication of your tribe's compact should
bring it into compliance with applicable federal law. In any event, the
approval of the compacts constitutes a change in circumstances warrant-
ing termination of the non-prosecution letter.... The letter of non-pros-
ecution shall afford the tribe no protection with respect to conduct
occurring after the date of termination.
Id.
67. See id. The Court provided figures of the vast amounts of money spent by
tribes to establish and improve casinos in New Mexico:
[T]he pueblo of Santa Ana spent $1,265,275.00 to expand their existing
gaming facility, along with $2,786,950.00 for furnishings and equipment
for the expanded facility .... [T]he San Filepe Gaming Enterprise in-
curred $17,266,869 in debt for the construction and expansion of a gam-
ing facility, of which "$16,723,869 was borrowed in reliance on the tribal-
state compact." The Pueblo of Tesuque committed approximately $4.1
million "to construction and equipment after Governor Johnson's inau-
guration and the approval of the Compact." The Pueblo of Isleta spent
over $20 million in connection with the construction of a resort/gaming/
hotel complex. The Pueblo of Pojoaque borrowed or spent over $15 mil-
lion dollars [sic] to renovate and expand gaming and horse-racing facili-
ties. The Pueblo of Acoma borrowed $3.5 million to purchase class III
gaming equipment and casino furnishings. The Pueblo of San Juan "in-
vested approximately $2 million in buildings, furniture, fixtures, and
equipment... and has entered into various contracts exceeding $5 mil-
lion for goods, services, and gaming devices for the operation of class III
gaming under the Compact."
Id. at 1550 n.6 (citations omitted).
68. 904 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1995). The New Mexico Supreme Court held that the
compacts and agreements authorized more forms of gaming than New Mexico law
permitted under any circumstances. See id. at 25. The court reached this conclu-
sion after examining the state constitution and other statutory authority and held
that no source gave Governor Johnson the authority to enter into the tribal com-
pacts for gaming. See id. at 25-26.
69. See id. at 26. The Court's analysis thus rested on determining whether the
entry into a compact is a creation or execution of law. See id. at 29-30.
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ally irrevocable right to conduct gaming under the agreement, the
disruption of legislative authority, and the historical role of a Gover-
nor, the court concluded that the Governor was acting beyond his
power in entering into the tribal compacts. 70 With the lack of statu-
tory authority allowing the Governor to assume such broad power
in the realm of Indian gaming, the court held that the Governor
was unable to properly authorize the compacts.
71
Second, in Bingo, Ltd. v. Otten,72 the New Mexico Supreme
Court held that electronic video gambling devices violated New
Mexico law and public policy. More importantly, the court stated
that New Mexico has a policy against gambling.73 The court also
stated that "video, electromechanical, and computer forms of spe-
cifically authorized games are against public policy.
'74
With Clark and Bingo expounding New Mexico's laws and pub-
lic policy against gaming, the Kelly court examined the grant of
summary judgment for the State by the district court and affirmed
the lower court's holding.75 The Tenth Circuit held that:
(1) IGRA imposes two separate requirements-the State
and the Tribe must have "entered into" a compact and the
compact must be "in effect" pursuant to Secretarial ap-
proval-before class III gaming is authorized; (2) state law
70. See id. at 34-35. The court, in finding that the Governor had exceeded his
authority, noted that the tribe's right to conduct gaming under the compact was
seemingly perpetual. See id. at 31. The authorization to allow the tribes to engage
in any forms of casino-games directly contravened the legislatures' specific and
expressed aversion to commercial gambling. See id. at 24.
71. See id. at 34-35.
72. 910 P.2d 281 (N.M. 1995). The specific issue before the Otten court was
whether a hand-held electronic device known as "Power Bingo" was a permissible
piece of gaming equipment under New Mexico's Bingo and Raffle Act. See id. at
281.
73. See id. at 282. The court interpreted narrowly the terms of the Bingo and
Raffle Act and noted that "[w]ith limited exceptions, gambling is a crime in New
Mexico." Id. at 283. The court expounded on this view of gambling in New Mex-
ico and stated:
We take judicial notice of recent newspaper references to "the Las Vegas-
night law" applicable to charities. While the record before this Court
does not reveal whether gambling devices traditionally found in casinos
have in fact been used in this state for gratuitous amusement or even to
make bets, we find no statutory authorization for any "Las Vegas-night"
gambling in New Mexico. We are cited to no authoritative use of the
term "lottery" to include casino-style gaming.
Id. at 283 n.2.
74. Id. at 287.
75. Pueblo of Santa Ana v. Kelly, 104 F.3d 1546, 1553 (10th Cir. 1997). The
court reviewed de novo the grant of summary judgment and drew all inferences in
favor of the party against whom the judgment was granted. See id. at 1552.
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determines the procedures by which a state may validly
enter into a compact; and (3) in determining whether the
State and the Tribes have entered into compacts, valid and
binding under New Mexico law, we agree with and follow
the New Mexico Supreme Court's decision in Clark. 76
In examining the "entered into" and "in effect" requirements,
the court examined the language of IGRA to determine whether
the requirements were separate or whether Secretarial approval of
the compacts was the only necessity under IGRA.7 7 The court
looked to the legislative history of IGRA and stated that it was
clearly the intent of the drafters to attempt to accommodate both
tribes and the states.78 In examining precedent where a particular
state representative lacked authority to enter into the compact, the
court noted that the district courts almost uniformly found that a
compact entered into by an agent without authority to bind the
state is void, regardless of the Secretary's approval. 79 In dismissing
the remaining claims of the tribe, the court held that a valid com-
pact was necessary for class III gaming, that there was no real dan-
ger of indefinite collateral attack, and that there need be more
than mere Secretarial approval of the compact.80
With regard to whether federal or state law governed the valid-
ity of the compact, the Tenth Circuit held that both state and fed-
eral law apply. While IGRA is a federal statute that presented
76. Id. at 1553.
77. See id. The court noted that the language of the statute suggests that the
"in effect" requirement establishes the date when the compact becomes effective
under IGRA, but arguably says nothing about whether a state has validly entered
into a compact. See id. at 1554.
78. See id. The legislative history quoted by the court states that "this legisla-
tion is intended to provide a means by which tribal and State governments can ...
work together to develop a regulatory and jurisdictional pattern that will foster a
consistency and uniformity in the manner in which laws regulating the conduct of
gaming activities are applied." S. REP. No. 100-446, at 6 (1988), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3071, 3076.
79. See id. at 1555. See also Narragansett Indian Tribe v. Rhode Island, No. 94-
0618, 1996 WL 97856, at *2 (D.R.I. Feb. 13, 1996) (holding that compact signed by
Governor who lacked authority to sign is void and given no legal effect); Kickapoo
Tribe of Indians v. Babbitt, 827 F. Supp. 37, 47 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding because
Governor signed compact without authority, state did not enter compact and com-
pact was invalid).
80. Kelly, 104 F.3d at 1556. While the court was sympathetic that the tribes
would lose millions of dollars if the compact was voided, the court stated that the
Indian tribes must bear some of the blame. See id. The court stated that the tribes
were aware, as evidenced by concessions during oral argument, that most com-
menced gaming before the compacts were approved and signed. See id.
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federal questions to federal courts, state law must determine if the
state has validly bound itself to a compact.
81
The final issue resolved by the court was whether the Governor
of New Mexico had the authority under the state constitution or
statute to bind the state to any compacts.8 2 Rather than reinvesti-
gate the issue, the Tenth Circuit accepted the New Mexico
Supreme Court's holding in Clark that the Governor lacked the au-
thority to bind the state to a tribal compact.83
The result of the Tenth Circuit's holding in Kelly was highly
deferential to the interests of the state. While the tribes spent mil-
lions of dollars updating and building casinos, the Tenth Circuit
displayed no hesitation in striking down the compact, thereby de-
stroying the investment and futures of those Indian tribes that had
wrongly assumed the compact was valid.8 4 Thus, Kelly followed the
lead of Seminole in holding the state's interest paramount against
Tribal-State gaming compacts and Indian opportunity.
B. New York v. Oneida Indian Nation
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed an ex-
clusionary clause of an arbitration provision contained in a tribal
gaming compact in New York v. Oneida Indian Nation.85 The Second
Circuit held against the Tribe and ordered that the alleged viola-
tion of the compact by the Tribe go to court rather than arbitra-
tion.86 In 1993, New York State and the Oneida Indian Nation of
New York executed a compact that included [in the back index] a
list of approved games.8 7 The Nation followed by making a request
81. For an example of applying state and federal law, see Washington v. Confed-
erated Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979) (discussing
transfer of civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian lands to state).
82. See Kelly, 104 F.3d at 1558-59.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 1556. The court notes that there are three other appeals involv-
ing the identical issues that will be determined by the outcome of this case: Apache
Tribe of the Mescalero Reservation v. New Mexico, No. 96-2156; Apache Tribe of the Mes-
calero Reservation v. Reno, No. 96-2199; and Jicarillo Apache Tribe v. Kelly, No. 96-2192.
See id. at 1548 n.2. It can safely be presumed that all the tribes in these cases on
appeal will also be out a financial fortune due to the Tenth Circuit's holding.
85. 90 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 1996).
86. See id.
87. See id. The compact was approved by the Acting Assistant Secretary of
Indian Affairs of the United States Department of the Interior as required under
25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (3) (B). See id. To amend the back appendix and add a new
game, the new specifications were required to be submitted in writing under the
terms of the compact. See id. The State was given 15 days to notify the Nation if it
accepted the amendment. See id.
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to include "Instant Multi-Game" and received instant approval from
the New York State Racing and Wagering Board.8 s
The compact contained provisions for arbitration8 9 but specifi-
cally stated that "[a] claim by the State that the nation is conducting
a class III gaming activity not authorized by this Compact is not
subject to mandatory arbitration."90 The Second Circuit examined
the exclusionary clause because it recognized that all clauses in a
contract must be given meaning.91 In conclusion, the court held
that the State's claim fell under the exclusionary clause and that it
was not the proper role of the court to stretch clear language and
defeat the intent of the contracting or compacting parties.
92
The result in Oneida is typical of the post-Seminole cases. Again,
it was the tribal nation that suffered from a misinterpretation of the
arbitration agreements under IGRA. The overall theme in Oneida,
and under IGRA generally, is that if the State's interest is somehow
implicated, whether it be an affirmative use of authority or a pur-
poseful intent to deny approval of an amendment, the court will
side with the state if the arguments are equally weighted.
93
C. Crow Tribe of Indians v. Racicot
Similar to Oneida, in an appeal before the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, the power of the state to intrude upon the land
and gaming operations of an Indian tribe was upheld.94 In March
1993, the Crow Tribe and the State of Montana executed a Tribal-
State compact authorizing class III gaming on the Crow Reserva-
88. See id. The Nation received the approval almost immediately and began
to offer the game until the State brought this action. See id. The Second Circuit
had jurisdiction under § 28 U.S.C. 1291. See id. The court specifically addressed
the holding in Seminole and stated that Seminole did not affect the current appeal.
See id.
89. See id. at 61. The arbitration provision reads "[e]xcept for disputes con-
cerning the games and activities permitted under this Compact, all disputes con-
cerning compliance with and interpretation of any provisions of the Compact shall
be resolved by binding arbitration in accordance with the procedures set forth
below." Id.
90. Oneida, 90 F.3d at 58.
91. See id. at 63. The lower court held that the exclusionary clause was inap-
plicable because the State's complaint did not on its face claim that the Instant
Multi-Game was not authorized under the compact. See id. The Second Circuit
held that the lower court's interpretation of the arbitration clause rendered the
exclusionary clause nearly meaningless, if not applied in the present context. See
id.
92. See id. at 64.
93. See id.
94. See Crow Tribe of Indians v. Racicot, 87 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1996).
[Vol. 5: p. 129
18
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1998], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol5/iss1/8
INDIAN GAMING LAW
tion.9 5 The approved compact permitted the Absaloka Casino En-
terprise (ACE) to own and operate the Little Bighorn Casino
located within the Crow Indian Reservation. 9 6 ACE filed declara-
tory judgment with the Crow Tribal Gaming Commission request-
ing a determination of whether mechanical slot machines were
authorized under the compact.9 7 The Commission held a hearing
and issued an order declaring that ACE could lawfully operate
mechanical slot machines under IGRA and the compact.98 On
June 18, 1994, state and federal agents entered the casino with a
search warrant and seized the slot machines. 99 The Crow filed suit
in district court and the court granted summary judgment against
all six of the Crow's claims. 10 0 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held
that the Commission's order allowed the State to allege that the
compact precluded the use of slot machines; that the use of slot
machines was not permitted under the compact; and that the lower
court properly granted summary judgment against the Fourth
Amendment and Due Process claims.' 0 1
1. The State Is Not Estopped
To determine the powers of the Commission, the court ex-
amined both the Tribal-State compact and the Tribal Gaming Ordi-
95. See id. at 1042. The direct impact of the Seminole holding in this case is not
an issue because the State and Crow had already adopted a Tribal-State compact.
See id. at 1042 n.1. However, the ultimate holding here is consistent with Seminole
in that the power of the State to interpret and regulate the existing compact was
held superior to that of the tribe. See id. at 1042.
96. See id. Absaloka Casino Enterprise, Inc. (ACE) is a tribally chartered cor-
poration wholly owned by the Crow. See id.
97. See id. The members of the tribe delegated to the Crow Tribal Gaming
Commission the authority to regulate class III gaming and issue regulations imple-
menting that authority. See id. The Commission passed regulations governing the
administrative proceedings relating to class III gaming. See id. Final decisions of
the Commission could be appealed to the Crow Tribal Court. See id.
98. See id. The State, represented by Governor Racicot, chose not to appear at
the hearing and sent a letter to the Commission stating that the Commission's
interpretation of the compact would not be binding on the State. See id. Governor
Racicot sent another letter repeating that the Commission's order was not binding
on the State; the compact did not provide for the use of slot machines; and that
the use of slot machines would be a failure by the Tribe to perform its part of the
compact. See id.
99. See Crow, 87 F.3d at 1042. The State did not attempt to seek relief from
the Commission's order in the Crow Tribal Court. See id.
100. See id. The Crow's claims were for declaratory, injunctive and monetary
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See id. The Crow's claims consisted of violations of
Equal Protection, Due Process and Fourth Amendment rights as well as State viola-
tions of the Crow's right to regulate class III gaming. See id.
101. See id. at 1046.
1998]
19
Cooper: What's in the Cards for the Future of Indian Gaming Law
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
148 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JouRNAL
nance, which was adopted by the Crow Tribal Council. 10 2 The
court stated that allowing the Commission to interpret the compact
would undermine the jurisdiction of the United States district
courts to enjoin gambling on lands not permitted under a com-
pact.1 03 If the Commission were permitted to interpret the com-
pact and that interpretation was made final after an appeal to the
Tribal Court, it would not be reviewable in federal court. 10 4 Thus,
to give a state a remedy in federal court, and to give substance to
the parties' intentions, the court held that the Commission lacked
authority to interpret the compact and that the State could argue
that the compact did not permit the operation of mechanical
slots.105
2. The Tribal-State Compact Does Not Permit Mechanical Slot Machines
One of the three requirements under IGRA for class III gam-
ing to be permitted is that the gaming must be conducted in ac-
cordance with the Tribal-State compact. 10 6 The court held that the
compact did not permit the use of mechanical slot machines, there-
fore this requirement was not met.10 7 The court examined appen-
dix F of the compact to determine if slot machines would be
102. See id. at 1043. While the compact provided little insight into the scope
of the Commission's power, the Tribal Gaming Ordinance provided a better un-
derstanding of the scope of the Commission's regulatory powers to the court. See
id. The Gaming Ordinance provides:
[t]he Crow Tribe is authorized to operate, license and regulate class III
gaming on Indian Lands, as defined at 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4) (b) within the
State of Montana, provided it has entered into, and operates Class III
gaming consistent with, a compact entered into between the Tribe and
the State of Montana.
Id. While the ordinance created the Commission and granted it powers from li-
censing and inspection to continuous study of class III gaming, what was notably
absent from the powers of the Commission was the authority to determine and
interpret what types of gaming the compact permitted. See id.
103. See id. The court quoted IGRA which reads, "[t]he United States district
courts shall have jurisdiction over.., any cause of action initiated by a State or
Indian tribe to enjoin a class III gaming activity located on Indian lands and con-
ducted in violation of any Tribal-State compact." Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C.
§ 2710(d) (7) (A) (ii)). For a further discussion of this IGRA section, see supra note
37.
104. See Crow, 87 F.3d at 1044. See also Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S.
9, 19 (1987) (holding unless federal court determines tribal court lacked jurisdic-
tion, proper deference to tribal court system precludes relitigation of issues raised
and resolved in tribal court).
105. See Crow, 87 F.3d at 1044. See also Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926, 937 (1986)
(holding agency power no greater than that delegated by legislature).
106. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d) (1) (1997). For a further discussion of this section,
see supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
107. See Crow, 87 F.3d at 1044.
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allowable. 10 8 The Crow argued through expert testimony and case
law that a lottery encompassed any game with elements of prize,
consideration and chance. 10 9 The State argued that the history be-
hind the current compact, including the fact that two other com-
pacts referring specifically to slot machines were rejected, and the
intent of the parties clearly illustrated that the State objected to the
tribes operating slot machines in their casinos. °10 The court agreed
with the State and held that although lotteries may include slot ma-
chines, in this instance, the parties' intention was not to include slot
machines under the compact.111
3. The Fourth Amendment and Due Process Claim
With regard to the Fourth Amendment claim, the Tribe
claimed that there was no probable cause to search the casino and
that the magistrate issuing the search warrant was misled by misrep-
resentations and omissions of fact.112 The court concluded that be-
cause there was a substantial basis for probable cause and no
omission or misrepresentation of facts, there was no resulting viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.113 The Ninth Circuit also held that
108. See id. Appendix F of the compact reads:
I. Definitions:
"Lottery Games." The term "Lottery Games" means any procedure,
including any on-line or other procedure using a machine or elec-
tronic device, by which one or more prizes are randomly distributed
among persons who have paid for a chance to win a prize but does not
include any game in which a player completes [sic] against or plays
with any other person.
II. Conditions
Lottery Games may be conducted on the Reservation if such games
are conducted and operated by the Tribe in a manner which provides
security at least as stringent as the Montana Lottery.
Id. (alteration in original).
109. See id. at 1045-46. See also Harris v. Missouri Gaming Comm'n, 869
S.W.2d 58, 64 (Mo. 1994) (stating that almost all other state courts have consid-
ered slot machines to be lotteries).
110. See Crow, 87 F.3d at 1045. The State rejected two proposed compacts by
the Crow Tribe because they included wide ranges on class III gaming, specifically
slot machines. See id. The State asserted that the Crow could only operate forms of
gaming permitted under Montana law and slot machines were prohibited. See id.
111. See id. The court determined that while generally slot machines are in-
cluded in the term "lottery," each case must be examined narrowly within the con-
text of the particular compact at issue. See id.
112. See id. at 1046. The tribe claimed thatJanetJessup, the Administrator of
the Montana Gambling Control Division, intentionally misled the magistrate in
her statements to state and federal agents. See id. It was Jessup's statements that
provided the probable cause for the search warrant. See id. at 1042.
113. See id. at 1046. Probable cause existed because the Crow did not have
the right to interpret the compact or operate slot machines. See id. Also, the court
held that the magistrate did not omit or misrepresent facts in her statements to
19981
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the district court properly granted summary judgement against the
Crow's Due Process claim. The court held that the Crows had no
property or liberty interest at stake due to the fact that an interest
in operating the slot machines was never created, therefore there
was no Due Process violation at issue.1 4 As with prior cases, Crow
stands for the proposition that states will be given a great deal of
latitude in describing their intent when entering into a compact.
4. Miami Tribe v. United States
The United States District Court for the District of Kansas de-
termined that a bingo facility could not be constructed and oper-
ated on Indian land in accordance with IGRA. 115 In 1995, the
National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) evaluated a class II
gaming management contract between the Miami Tribe of
Oklahoma and Butler National Service Corporation.1 1 6 The NIGC
invalidated the management contract.1 7 Miami Tribe challenged
the NIGC rule under both the IGRA and the procedure used in
reaching the decision, arguing both were improper. 18
a. Relying on the statement by the Department of the Interior
Miami Tribe contended that it was improper for the NIGC to
rely on the legal analysis of the Department of the Interior rather
state and federal agents and that her conduct was objectively reasonable. See id.
Thus, she was entitled to qualified immunity. See id.
114. See id. The court held that there was no property or liberty interest be-
cause the compact with the State of Montana did not create an interest in the
operation of a mechanical slot machine. See id.
115. See Miami Tribe v. United States, 927 F. Supp. 1419 (D. Kan. 1996). This
case was brought as a review of the National Indian Gaming Commission's (NIGC)
decision against the Tribe. See id.
116. See id. at 1420. In this management contract, the Tribe proposed to
build a bingo facility on a piece of land, known as the Maria Christiana Miami
Reserve No. 35, totaling approximately 35 acres. See id. at 1421. An Indian tribe
may enter into such a building contract, subject to the approval of the chairman of
the NIGC, under 25 U.S.C. § 2711. See id. at 1421.
117. See id. The NIGC rejected the management contract on four bases. See
id. First, the management contract was not authorized by the Miami Tribe Gaming
Act (MTGA), the tribal ordinance that governed gambling. See id. Second, there
was no environmental impact determination made regarding the proposed devel-
opment. See id. Third, the background investigations were not complete as re-
quired by 25 C.F.R. § 537. See id. Fourth, the Tribe had not submitted proper
documents or had submitted incomplete documents. See id. Though Miami Tribe
appealed, the NIGC affirmed and three months later supplemented its ruling with
an opinion by the Department of the Interior that the reserve was not Indian land
under the definitions of IGRA. See id.
118. See id.
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than following the procedures in 5 U.S.C. § 554.119 The court re-
jected this claim and held that NIGC was not obligated to comply
with 5 U.S.C. § 554 and that relying on a legal opinion of the De-
partment of the Interior was permissible and did not violate Due
Process.
1 20
b. Jurisdiction of the Miami Tribe
The Miami Tribe argued that it had jurisdiction over Reserve
No. 35 and its right to operate a casino. The court held that the
tribe did not have jurisdiction based on both its history and mem-
bership. Under an 1840 treaty, land in Kansas was set aside for the
Miami Tribe who emigrated from Indiana in 1846, and later moved
from Kansas to Oklahoma.1 2 1 The government considered those
who stayed in Kansas without the Tribe to have severed their ties
with the Tribe and thus considered them United States citizens.
12 2
The court held that neither the remaining members nor the history
of the reservation established jurisdiction. 123 Finally, the court held
that the claims of the people who stated that they were members of
the Tribe, which would have provided jurisdiction resulting from
tribal membership, must also fail.
12 4
119. See id. Section 554 applies when the statute requires adjudication to be
determined on the record after the opportunity for an agency hearing. 5 U.S.C.
§ 554(a) (1996). See alsoYork v. Secretary of Treasury, 774 F.2d 417, 420 (10th Cir.
1985) (requiring adjudication after opportunity for agency hearing).
120. See Miami Tribe, 927 F. Supp. at 1422. The court considered Miami
Tribe's position fully briefed and that the Tribe's participation in the process was
"solicited, received, and considered." See id. Additionally, IGRA does not entitle
the Tribe to a hearing on this question. See id. Due to these facts, the court held
that the Tribe had received due process. See id.
121. See id. at 1424-28. In 1840, the Tribe ceded all of its land in Indiana and
agreed to move to land assigned to it within five years. See id. at 1424. The U.S.
Senate set aside land in Kansas to which some of the Tribe moved to and possessed
in 1846. See id. Those members of the Tribe that remained in Indiana were no
longer considered to be members of the Tribe. See id. Eventually, the Tribe
moved to Oklahoma and was reimbursed for the land in Kansas. See id. at 1426.
122. See id. at 1426.
123. See id. at 1427. The court examined legislative history in determining
that those tribe members who remained in Kansas were not the tribe's heirs. See
id. The court held that those Miami Indians that remained in Kansas became citi-
zens pursuant to an 1867 treaty and 1873 legislation. See id. The court also held
that if there were Miami Tribe members that remained and did not become citi-
zens under the 1873 legislation, these people became naturalized citizens under
federal legislation enacted in 1924. See id. (citing Act ofJune 2, 1924, 43 Stat. 253).
Thus, Congress abrogated the jurisdiction over Reserve No. 35 no later than 1924.
See id.
124. See id. at 1428. The court held that the record of legislation by the fed-
eral government, including ordinances passed by the Tribe, provided that the
Tribe cannot establish the existence ofjurisdiction through membership of past or
present owners of Reserve No. 35 in the Miami Tribe. See id. at 1427-28.
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Thus, the court affirmed the NIGC's determination that Re-
serve No. 35 was not Indian land pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2703
(4) 125 The significance of this decision is that in holding for state
power over the tribes, courts will view the boundaries of Indian land
narrowly in light of the intricate web of past federal government
treaties with each individual tribe.
12 6
III. THE EFFECT oF GAMING ON INDIAN TRIBES AND
AMERICAN SOCIETY
It is necessary to examine the recent interpretations of IGRA
along with the manner in which IGRA has affected Indian tribes
and populations as a whole. Today, in America, gambling is a $30
billion industry and is legal in every state except Utah and Ha-
waii. 12 7 In 1992, State lotteries alone provided the states with $11.5
billion.12 8 While the vast amount of revenue that gaming generates
annually has sparked debate among congressmen and sociologists,
Indian gaming has been targeted as a primary factor in pushing
gaming into mainstream society. Ironically, Indian gaming
amounted to less than five percent of the United States' $30 billion
gambling profits in 1992.129 The impact of IGRA has affected not
only certain tribes' economies, but also tribal traditions and
cultures.
A. Tribes Before IGRA
American Indian reservations are notable for their extreme
and persistent poverty. In fact, reservation Indians were the
poorest minority group in America with twenty-seven percent of all
125. See Miami Tribe, 927 F. Supp. at 1428.
126. For a present example of this particular aspect of state power, see
Sokaogon Chippewa Community v. Babbitt, 929 F. Supp. 1165 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (hold-
ing that there was no improper influence by officials in violation of IGRA in
preventing Wisconsin tribes from acquiring property "outside of reservation lands"
for establishment of casino). Again, the ideas furthered by the State were held
paramount to the Tribe's request to establish casino gaming. See id.
127. See Francis X. Clines, Gambling, Pariah No More, Is Booming Across America,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1993, at Al.
128. See Naomi Mezey, The Distribution of Wealth, Sovereignty, and Culture
Through Indian Gaming, 48 STAN. L. REv. 711 (1996). State lotteries alone ex-
ceeded the total revenues accumulated by all casino games in 1992. See id. at 712.
Lotteries have become a regular part of American culture because both churches
and states depend on the revenue lotteries create each year. See id. In 1992, Amer-
icans spent six times more on gambling than movie tickets. See Clines, supra note
127, at Al.
129. See Mezey, supra note 128, at 712.
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Native American households falling below the poverty line.' 30 Of
course, this high poverty rate is partially the result of the tremen-
dous unemployment prevalent on the reservations.131 The national
average unemployment rate on Indian reservations was forty-six
percent in 1989, while the 1989 national average unemployment
rate for all races in the United States was only five percent. 132 Due
to the high unemployment and corresponding poverty prevalent
among the reservations, there is also a high dependence on public
assistance and government programs.'3 3 While certain aspects of
gaming provide some tribes with economic stability and political
power, these "fortunate" tribes have also experienced the negative
social repercussions of legalized gambling.
34
B. The Economics of Indian Gaming
Tribal gaming solves some of the economic problems faced by
reservations throughout America. Revenue from tribal gaming
leads to additional and better reservation schools, water and sewer
systems, and health clinics. 135 Successful reservations can reduce
unemployment virtually to zero and thereby reduce the tribe's de-
pendence on federal and state funding. 136 Some tribes are so suc-
130. See Gary Fields & Linda Kainamine, Indian Data Shows 27% Live in Pov-
erty, USA TODAY, Nov. 17, 1994, at A3 (citing 1994 Census Report). Some tribes far
exceed this number, such as the Navajo Tribe where more than 45% of the fami-
lies live in poverty. See Mezey, supra note 128, at 714.
131. See Mezey, supra note 128, at 714 (citing Stephen Cornell & Joseph P.
Kalt, Malcolm Wiener Ctr. For Social Policy, Where's the Glue? Institutional Bases of
American Indian Economic Development (Harvard Project on Am. Indian Econ. Dev.,
Report No. 52, 1991)). The national average of unemployment on reservations in
1989 was 46%. See id. Included in the average were ranges of seven percent unem-
ployment on the Jicarilla Apache Reservation in New Mexico to an astounding
high of 90% unemployment on the Rosebud Reservation in South Dakota. See id.
132. See id. Additionally, of the 67 reservations surveyed by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs in 1989, 29 had unemployment rates of at least 50% or higher with
the Rosebud Reservation in South Dakota at 90% unemployment. See id.
133. See id. (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM., 1990 CENSUS
OF POPULATION: CHARACTERISTICS OF AMERICAN INDIANS BY TRIBE AND LANGUAGE tbl.
6, at 182 (1994)).
134. See Mezey, supra note 128, at 715. IGRA is not an across the board wealth
transfer because only those tribes that choose to open gaming operations, and
then only those whose operations are profitable, actually benefit. See id. The In-
dian tribes operate, capitalize on gaming and receive public assistance separately
and independently of each other. See id.
135. See Joint Hearings on S.4 78 Before the Senate Comm. On Indian Affairs and the
Subcomm. On Native American & Insular Affairs of the House Comm. On Resources,
104th Cong. (1995).
136. Gov. Engler and Tribal Leaders Sign Compact, PR NEwswlEr, Sept. 25, 1995,
at 1. This articles reports that 34% of Indian Gaming operations employees col-
lected public assistance before they began working for the gaming enterprises,
38% were unemployed and 17% went from part-time to full-time work when hired
1998]
25
Cooper: What's in the Cards for the Future of Indian Gaming Law
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
154 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JOURNAL
cessful that their prosperity spills over to the surrounding
communities in the form of higher employment and additional rev-
enue for surrounding areas. 137 Successful casinos mean that a state
can recapture the funds that constituents would spend in out of
state casinos. 1
38
One tribe that has benefitted from IGRA is the Mashantucket
Peqout Indians in southeastern Connecticut. After being declared
extinct in Connecticut in the 1970s, the tribe became officially rec-
ognized in Connecticut and currently runs the single most profita-
ble casino in the country. 139 The tribe has used the massive
revenue to raise the standard of living on their reservation.' 40 In
exchange for their good fortune, the tribe pays the state of Con-
necticut over $100 million annually to protect its current monopoly
on slot machines in Connecticut. 141 Additionally, the tribe has con-
by the gaming operations. See id. The Tribal Chairman of the Pokagon Band of
Potawatomi Indians who entered a compact in Michigan stated "[w] e've seen in
Michigan how tribal gaming has helped . . . promote self-sufficiency .... Tribal
gaming has enabled tribes to provide jobs, housing, education, health care and,
especially care for the elders." Id.
137. See Modern Pilgrims Turn to Indians for Money, Jobs, REuTERS Bus. REP.,
Sept. 29, 1995, at 1. This article provided the terms of a compact between Massa-
chusetts and the Wampanoag Tribe which included $90 million shared revenue
payments to the state annually for six years, and two percent of the casino's net
revenues spent to "establish programs to aid compulsive gamblers." Id. Addition-
ally, the casino agreed to employ 3,000 people to build the casino and another
5,400 workers to operate the casino. See id.
138. See Jason D. Kolkema, Federal Policy of Indian Gaming on Newly Acquired
Lands and the Threat to Approval of Gaming on Off-Reservation Sites, 73 U. DET. MERCY
L. REv. 361, 370 n.60 (1996) (citing DELOrIE & TOUCHE, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
CASINO GAMING ON THE STATE OF MICHIGAN (1995)). A recent study found that
Michigan was expected to leak approximately $1.6 billion per year in gambling
funds spent by Michigan residents in other states. See id. The study further re-
ported that the expansion of gaming in Michigan would result in nearly 100%
recapture of almost $700 million a year from gaming in Canada. See id. Addition-
ally, gaming can contribute to state economies by inducing spending in other sec-
tors of the economy and increasing out-of-state visitation. See id.
139. See KirkJohnson, Tribe's Promised Land Is Rich But Uneasy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
20, 1995, at Al. In 1994, the Foxwoods Casino brought in gross profits of over
$800 million, twice the amount as the most profitable casinos in Atlantic City and
Las Vegas. See id.
140. See Mezey, supra note 128, at 725. Every member of the tribe is guaran-
teed a house on the reservation or in town and ajob with an average annual salary
of $50,000 to $60,000 a year. See id. Even single parents who stay home to raise
their children receive a salary. See id. Every member of the tribe is also guaranteed
a paid education from preschool through a doctorate degree in the field of their
choosing. See id.
141. See id.
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tributed $10 million, the largest gift ever received, to the Smithso-
nian Museum for an American Indian Building.
142
While some tribes like the Pequots have profited as a result of
IGRA, there are also economic consequences that simultaneously
disadvantage both states and other tribes. The first problem tribes
face is that relatively few tribes engage in gaming operations. Of
the 550 federally recognized tribes, only ninety-nine of them oper-
ated high-stakes gaming operations in 1994.143 Thus, the other
tribes who are unable to obtain the large loans needed to establish
casinos, are simply unable to enter the market and reap the gaming
rewards. 144 The second problem for the tribes is the instability of
the casino gaming market. Existing casinos will have to compete
not only with other tribes but also with states, which may continue
to lessen their gaming restrictions and further saturate the mar-
ket.145 A third problem, suggested by Paul Samuelson, a Nobel
prize-winning economist, is that legalized gambling is economically
questionable. 1
4 6
142. See id. Charitable giving is not unique to the Pequots among Indian
tribes involved in gaming. The Barona Band of Indians donated over $1 million to
local charitable organizations and specifically donated $500,000 to Sharp Health-
care to establish the Barona Casino Cardiac Research and Education Endowment
Program. See Sharp Healthcare Dedicates Barona Casino Research & Education Suite, PR
NEWSWIPE, Aug. 28, 1995, at 1.
143. See Ben Campbell, Indian Gaming Is No Economic Panacea, DENv. POsr,
Dec. 26, 1994, at 7B. Campbell states that the media portrays Indian gaming reve-
nues to be far more excessive than actual revenues. See id.
144. See Mezey, supra note 128, at 736. Where some scholars and experts rec-
ommend that gaming and non-gaming tribes pool their resources together to ob-
tain the loans to build and operate casinos, the trust status of tribal lands makes
obtaining loans difficult. See id. Additionally, others recommend that tribes that
are currently involved in gaming make loans to non-gaming tribes. See id. How-
ever, as Mezey suggests, it is unlikely that gaming tribes will provide loans to other
tribes to establish casinos because of the threat of competition. See id.
145. See id. There already exists intense competition between casinos. Those
casinos that are not in densely populated areas must be dependent on seasonal
and sometimes erratic tourism. See id. For a further discussion, see William R.
Eadington, Casinos Are No Economic Cure-Al N.Y. TiMfs, June 13, 1993, at F13 (stat-
ing that market levels will inevitably level out).
146. 141 CONG. Rzc. S10912-04, at 125 (daily ed. July 31, 1995) (statement of
Paul Simon, quoting Paul Samuelson). Samuelson states:
There is a substantial economic case to be made against gambling. It
involves simply sterile transfers of money or goods between individuals,
creating no new money or goods. Although it creates no output, gam-
bling does nevertheless absorb time and resources. When pursued be-
yond the limits of recreation . . . gambling subtracts from the national
income.
Id. (alteration in original).
1998]
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Gaming activity can also hurt states because gaming diverts
money that is normally spent on local goods and services. 147 Be-
cause casinos do not exist in a vacuum, the money spent on gam-
bling is money no longer spent on entertainment, recreation,
restaurants, services and retail. 148 With these factors in mind, one
author stated that "IGRA is gambling against some fundamental
economic principles. 11
49
C. The Social Impact of Legalized Gambling
1. The Traditionalist Backlash
Indian backlash is one social result of IGRA caused by Indian
traditionalism.1 5 0  Traditionalists in Indian tribes embrace the
tribe's cultural heritage and reject government intrusion, state or
federal, into any aspect of Indian government on the reservation.15 1
According to traditionalists, the community needs to be separate
from external factors and centered in local decision making and
political power.152 They view gaming as a violation of Indian sover-
eignty and an introduction of a materialistic evil that erodes cul-
tural heritage and promotes assimilation. 153 Thus, traditionalists
view IGRA as simply a temptation to a poor people1 54 and abso-
lutely reject IGRA and members of the tribe who would embrace
such gaming. 155
147. See Kolkema, supra note 138, at 370.
148. See id. In a recent study, it was found that the expansion of gaming in
Michigan would result in a $160.5 million per year loss to other sectors of the
economy. See id. at 371 n.67.
149. Mezey, supra note 128, at 737.
150. See id. at 728.
151. See id. Native American traditionalists consider sovereignty fundamental
to cultural integrity. See id. The traditionalists view nationhood as the one form of
true independence and because IGRA allows an outside entity, namely the state or
federal government to regulate an aspect of tribal power, the traditionalists reject
gaming under IGRA. See id.
152. See id. Self-government is the one item that guarantees the recognition
of superior political power by the tribe. See id.
153. See id. Traditionalists consider gaming as incompatible with tribal teach-
ings. See id. at 728-29. While some tribes do have a history of traditional gambling
practices, the traditional gaming was a means of redistributing resources in the
society or promoting gifts intended to teach the threat and dangers of materialism
to the tribe. See id. at 729. Traditionalists view gaming as the final step of assimila-
tion and annihilation of the Indian culture. See id.
154. See Mezey, supra note 128, at 730. IGRA, according to a traditionalist,
requires that a tribe weigh the past and other intangible values against the possibil-
ity of material wealth. See id.
155. See id. One example of a tribe demonstrating the internal conflict that
IGRA has caused among some tribes is the Mohawks of Akwesasne. See id. at 729.
Gaming caused division in this once unified tribe and caused traditionalists to
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Of course, not all tribes take the traditionalist perspective.
Some maintain that gaming enhances a tribe's ability to re-engage
its cultural heritage on the reservation. The Peqout tribe of Con-
necticut is one such tribe that has used gaming as a means of enact-
ing its own cultural revival. Due to their unbridled success, the
Peqout take the view that gaming has allowed them the right to
earn sovereignty, cultural identity and a high standard of living.
156
The wealth the tribe has generated gives them freedom from gov-
ernment programs and state interference outside of the gaming
arena. 157 It should be noted, however, that the Peqout cultural




A second social aspect of gaming is the spread of compulsive
gambling through the tribes and reservations. Studies suggest that
the availability of gambling increases the numbers of compulsive
gamblers. 15 9 As with most addictive behavior, pathological gam-
bling is associated with a variety of social problems that support the
habit, ranging from alcoholism to unemployment. 160 Additionally,
abandon the reservation and establish a separate community. See id. The separa-
tion was a result of the opening of the Mohawk Bingo Palace in 1983, which was
followed by other gaming facilities. See id. Traditionalists described the gaming as
.a poisoning of the spirit, an erosion of cultural integrity. It comes.., in the form
of bingo halls, cigarette smuggling, tax-free gasoline and casinos." Id. (quoting
Mary Esch, Mohawks Seek to Save Language, Revive Culture, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1994,
at A3) (alteration in original).
156. See id. at 727. The Pequots believe that they effectively used IGRA to
benefit the tribe. See id. Because the average annual salary for a member of the
tribe from gaming revenues is $50,000 to $60,000 a year, parents have the luxury of
forgoing employment to raise their children, thus promoting education and cul-
tural heritage. See id. at 725.
157. See id. at 726-27.
158. See id. at 725-26. While the Peqout need to prove that they are one-six-
teenth Peqout to become a recognized member of the tribe, few Pequots are sure
what belonging to the tribe signifies or means historically. See id. One Peqout
confessed that the Indian paintings that decorate his home are generic while an-
other admits that the majority of what he knows of tribal history he has learned
from an anthropologist the tribe hires to investigate old reservation campsites. See
id. at 726. It may be this lack of cultural identity that allows the majority of Peqouts
to freely accept and integrate their enormous wealth with their Indian heritage.
159. 141 CONG. REc. S10912-04, at 125 (daily ed.July 31, 1995). Although less
than one percent of the population are compulsive gamblers, this number in-
creases two to seven times if casinos are located near a population. See id. The
greatest growth of compulsive gamblers is among teenagers and college students.
See id.
160. See id. One study of problem gamblers found 23% to be alcoholics, 26%
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the addicted gambler may resort to acts of desperation to feed the
addiction.16' While gambling promises fast payments to those who
play, gambling attracts individuals of lower economic status and
helps them remain in that lower status. 162 Like the rest of the pop-
ulation in the United States, Native Americans also suffer from
gambling addictions. Problem gambling rates in the Native Ameri-
can population, however, are two or three times greater than
among the white population. 163 Among several North Dakota
tribes that operate gambling under IGRA, rates of problem gam-
bling and addiction are even higher.1 64 As a result, problem gam-
bling and the accompanying negative social consequences are
unfortunate problems facing the tribes.
3. Crime
Where large sums of money are involved, the inevitable prob-
lem of organized crime is always an issue. The operation of legal-
ized gambling under IGRA carries with it the possible and probable
increase of organized crime. 165 Due to the amount of money at
stake in the casinos, the Indian reservation casinos are an easy tar-
get for money launderers.1 66 Political corruption is also an issue
because of the ability of an organization to make un-paralleled
profits with the help of government approval.1 67 Though there
161. See Kolkema, supra note 138, at 371. Typical acts of desperation may
include sale of personal belongings, criminal activity and suicide. See id. About
one in five problem gamblers attempt suicide, a rate higher than alcoholics or
drug addicts. See id. at 371 n.76.
162. See id. at 371-72 (citing Patricia Simms, Study Says Gambling Is State Loser;
Societal Costs Are High, Wis. ST. J., Apr. 10, 1995, at 1A (stating that less than 15% of
individuals that gamble have household incomes over $60,000 per year, while 30%
have household incomes under $20,000)).
163. See Don A. Conzetto, The Economic and Social Implications of Indian Gam-
bling: The Case of Minnesota, 19 Am. INDIAN CuL-ruRE & RES. J. 1 (1995).
164. See id. This higher rate of problem gambling and addiction is most likely
attributable to the higher number per capita of reservations and tribal gaming in
the North Dakota regions.
165. See George Weeks, Engler Looks at Gambling Across US.: States' Experiences
With Crime, Revenue May Affect His Decision, DET. NEWS, June 26, 1995, at Al. The
article quoted Frank Kelly, the Michigan Attorney General, who reported that if
casino gambling were allowed to enter the state, Michigan and the other states will
see the greatest increase in crime and corruption in our history. See id. Gambling
has been linked to increases in: driving under the influence, forgery, prostitution,
embezzlement, counterfeiting, car thefts and burglaries. See id.
166. See Kolkema, supra note 138, at 372. The Crime Commission reported to
the Mayor of Chicago that organized crime will infiltrate casino operations and
unions, and will be involved in loan sharking. See id. at 372 n.81.
167. See id. at 372. The following list of political corruption related to gam-
bling was given by Frank Wolf, a representative of Virginia:
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have been no reported cases of organized crime, 168 the federal reg-
ulatory commission assigned to organized crime is a weak deterrent
due to its minimal staff.169 As a result of the danger of organized
crime, legislators have proposed the creation of a commission to
study organized crime in the tribal casino setting and to recom-
mend the level at which a state should regulate such enterprises.
170
IV. THE FuTURE OF INDIAN GAMING
There are two prevailing views as to the future of Indian gam-
ing. One view is that Indian sovereignty will achieve parity with
state sovereignty and result in the protection and expansion of In-
dian gaming throughout the United States. The second view is that
states' rights will dominate Indian sovereignty and result in further
restrictions and control by states over Indian gaming.
A. IGRA With a Pro-Indian Future
While recent holdings may signal a restrictive interpretation of
IGRA, there is a possibility that the future of IGRA will bring Indian
sovereignty with regards to tribal gaming regulation. Three pos-
sibilities for a positive tribal gaming future are: (1) an amendment
re-enacting IGRA under the commerce clause of the Constitution;
(2) allowing tribal gaming on newly acquired tribal lands outside of
the reservation; (3) positive legislation from states and Congress as
a result of the new political power obtained from the tribal gaming
industry.
Seventeen South Carolina legislators were convicted of taking bribes to
legalize horse and dog track racing. Six Arizona legislators pleaded guilty
in 1990 for accepting bribes on a bill to legalize casino gambling. Seven
Kentucky legislators pleaded guilty of bribery for the same. In 1990, a
former West Virginia Governor pleaded guilty to taking a bribe from rac-
ing interests. In 1994, a West Virginia lottery director was sentenced to
Federal prison for rigging a video lottery contract.
Id. at 372 n.83 (quoting 141 CONG. REc. E86-02, at 6 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1995)
(statement of Representative Wolf).
168. See id. Three instances of casino management and supply companies
with suspicious ties to organized crime were reported, raising doubts concerning
the integrity of Indian casinos. See id. at 372 n.85 (citing James Popkin, Gambling
With the Mob?, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Aug. 23, 1993, at 30).
169. See id. at 372-73. While state governments may have large forces with vast
resources to monitor Indian gaming, there are less than 30 federal staff members
assigned to regulate and watch Indian gaming for crime. See id.
170. See id. The proposed National Gambling Impact and Policy Commission
would be composed of nine members and would review the effectiveness and cost
of federal and state gambling policies. See id. at 373 n.88.
1998]
31
Cooper: What's in the Cards for the Future of Indian Gaming Law
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1998
160 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JOURNAL
1. Re-enacting IGRA Under the Commerce Clause
Congress enacted IGRA under the Indian Commerce
Clause.1 7 1 While the Indian Commerce Clause has been inter-
preted restrictively in the past, the Interstate Commerce Clause of
the Constitution provides that Congress has the power to regulate
all commerce that affects more than one state. 172 Because courts
have interpreted the power to regulate interstate commerce
broadly, and most gaming on reservations draws many out of state
gamblers and money, Indian gaming would easily fall under the
scope of the commerce clause; and thus is subject to Congressional
control.1 73 Therefore, it stands to reason that the controversy sur-
rounding tribes and states under IGRA could be resolved by
amending the Act with a statement indicating that IGRA be re-en-
acted under the Congress' Interstate Commerce authority.
174 If
Congress had conclusive authority to regulate IGRA, the tribes
might receive fairer treatment than they currently receive.
2. Expansion of Gaming on Newly Acquired Lands
Currently under IGRA, gaming is not allowed on lands ac-
quired by an Indian reservation in trust after October 17, 1988.175
This section is clearly the result of Congress' intent to allow states to
keep Indian gaming on the reservation. Because IGRA was in-
tended to be a compromise between the states and the tribes, IGRA
contains an exception to this general rule and allows gambling on
after-acquired lands not on the reservation. 176 With a sympathetic
171. See Brian M. Greene, The Reservation Gambling Fury: Modern Indian Upris-
ing or Unfair Restraint on Tribal Sovereignty?, 10 BYU J. PUB. L. 93, 113 (1996).
172. See id. at 113-14.
173. See id. at 114.
174. See id.
175. 25 U.S.C. § 2719(a) (1994). The statute reads "Except as provided in
subsection (b) of this section, gaming regulated by this chapter shall not be con-
ducted on lands acquired by the Secretary in trust for the benefit of an Indian
tribe after October 17, 1988 ... ." Id.
176. Id. § 2719(b)(1)(A). The statute provides an exception to the general
rule and reads:
(1) Subsection (a) of this section will not apply when -
(A) the Secretary, after consultation with the Indian tribe and appro-
priate State and local officials, including officials of other nearby In-
dian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment on newly
acquired lands would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe and
its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding com-
munity, but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming
activity is to be conducted concurs in the Secretary's determination
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governor, and the right Secretary of the Interior, remote tribes
could prosper under current IGRA law by purchasing land near
populated areas and conducting gambling operations.177 While
limited, this exception could be the vehicle through which addi-
tional tribes enter the gaming arena. Constitutional objections by
the states could be overcome by proper judicial interpretation. 178
While some states' rights advocates recommend amendment or
abolishment of this exception, the exception is better seen as a con-
stitutional piece of legislation furthering economic development
without undermining state sovereignty.179
3. The Increased Political Power of the Tribes
As with any organization, vast sums of money buy political in-
fluence and protection from government intrusion. By funneling
money to the state and federal governments, tribes have become
politically sophisticated in protecting their futures. For instance,
the Pequots of Connecticut between 1993 and 1995 ranked first in
political contributions from the gaming industry by contributing
$465,000 to politicians.'80 Additionally, the tribes have enlisted
professional lobbying firms that represent large corporate clients
such as Exxon and Metropolitan Life Insurance Company. 181 The
Pequots have also contributed money to the state of Connecticut in
order to improve state political protection and favor.1 82 With these
177. One example of a tribe that could prosper under this exception would
be the Siletz Tribe of Oregon that is confined to a mountainous region near the
coast. See Kolkema, supra note 138, at 368 (citing All Things Considered, Native Gam-
bling is a Major Revenue Source, (NPR radio broadcast, July 18, 1992)). This tribal
reservation is only accessible by one road that winds through the mountains and
clearly makes the ability to run a gaming operation impossible. See id. at 368 n.53.
178. See id. at 390 (providing tribes have access and resources to purchase
such land).
179. See id.
180. SeeJoseph P. Shapiro et al., America's Gambling Fever: The Nation's Favorite
Pastime Comes Under Fire From Those Who Fear It Won't Help Communities and Families in
the Long Run, U.S. NEws & WoRLD REP., Jan. 15, 1996, at 55. In fact, the Pequots
shared their generosity with both political parties by contributing $365,000 to the
Democratic National Committee and $100,000 to the Republican National Com-
mittee. See Benjamin Sheffner, Gambling U.S.A.; Money Talks: The Gaming Industry Is
Becoming a Major Force in Washington Through the Financing of Congressional Elections,
BALTnMORE SUN, Nov. 26, 1995, at IF.
181. See Kevin J. Worthen & Wayne R. Farnsworth, Who Will Control the Future
of Indian Gaming? "A Few Pages of History Are Worth a Volume of Logic," 1996 BYU L.
REv. 407, 444 n.191 (1996).
182. See id. at 444. The Pequots contributed $15 million to Connecticut to
balance the state's budget. See id. (citing Jon Frandsen, Pequots' Casino Expected to
Be Good Bet for Years, GANNET NEws SERV., Feb. 6, 1996). The tribe also contributes,
under a Tribal-State compact, 25% of slot machine gross revenues equaling $124
million to Connecticut annually. See id. (citing Patrick Lakamp, Time's Running
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large donations and expenses aimed at accumulating political pro-
tection, Indian gaming as a whole will be better protected in the
future from state and federal government interference.
B. IGRA with a Restrictive Tribal Future
While there may be a future for IGRA which involves expan-
sion beyond the control of the federal government and state inter-
ference for the tribes, it is likely that the future will hold even more
restrictive control of tribal gaming operations. Three areas in
which the federal and state governments are likely to further con-
trol the power of the tribes are: (1) additional local control in ap-
proving tribal gaming compacts, (2) the imposition of taxes and (3)
the limit of tribes acquiring new lands on which to build and oper-
ate casinos.
1. Additional Local Control Over the Approval of Compacts
Recent legislative proposals suggest that Congress intends to
favor states' rights by requiring approval of proposed Indian gam-
ing by local officials in addition to the state governors. One propo-
sal by the Congress empowers the city council, county
commissioner and other governing bodies in the jurisdiction of the
proposed gaming to approve the proposed compact along with a
majority of voters.' 83
Other proposed legislation would require the Tribal-State com-
pact to be approved by the legislature of the state and governor
while limiting the types of class III gaming to that allowed for com-
mercial rather than charitable organizations within the state. 184
While such provisions do not allow a state to directly acquire reser-
vation revenues, such amendments will allow states greater leverage
in the compact bargaining process, thus extracting additional eco-
Out: Native Casinos Threatened With Taxes, Regulation, THE POST-STANDARD (Syracuse,
N.Y.), Oct. 13, 1995, at A8).
183. See H.R. 1364, 104th Cong. (1995). The proposed legislation provides
that:
(10) (A) A Tribal-State compact may not take effect until after -
(i) the elected governing body and elected executive officials (in-
cluding the city council, county commissioner, mayor, and similar
positions) in the political jurisdiction in which a class III gaming ac-
tivity under the compact is to occur have approved the compact; and
(ii) the compact is then approved by majority vote in a referendum
held in each such political subdivision in the first general election
(with respect to which the filing deadline has not passed) occurring
after the date on which the compact is approved under clause (i).
Id. at 1.
184. See H.R. 1512, 104th Cong. (1995).
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nomic concessions from the tribes. 185 The end result is that tribes
will lose the ability to conduct gaming or will be given the privilege
at a huge sovereignty and monetary cost from the state's compact
"negotiations."
2. Taxing the Tribes
Tribes have traditionally been exempt from paying federal and
particularly state taxes on most items and services. Recently, how-
ever, some recent budget proposals would impose a federal tax on
Indian gaming revenues. 186 Due to increasing demands to reduce
the federal budget, while not increasing spending or the size of gov-
ernment, a federal Indian casino and gaming tax would have gener-
ated an estimated $345 million for the budget.1 87 These plans
exemplify Congress' changing view that tribal revenues provide an
untapped source for federal tax dollars. Additionally, with state
treasuries in need of additional funding, the federal and state gov-
ernments are likely to unite and share in the tribes new found
wealth. As one author has written, "when federal and state interests
are aligned, federal and state governments have had no trouble in
taking tribal resources.
188
3. Limiting Tribe's Acquisition of Land For Gaming Purposes
While tribes that reside on reservations in sparsely populated
and isolated areas of the country may only realistically pursue gam-
ing by acquiring new lands near populated areas, Congress may
soon eliminate this capability under the Indian Trust Land Reform
Act of 1995.189 The bill proposes to differentiate between wealthy
and poor tribes in granting new lands on which to operate gam-
ing.190 The bill "would prohibit the Secretary of Interior from tak-
ing any lands located outside of the boundaries of an Indian
reservation in trust on behalf of an economically self-sufficient In-
dian tribe, if those lands are to be used for gaming or any other
commercial purpose." 191 The Secretary of the Interior would deter-
185. See Worthen & Farnworth, supra note 181, at 442.
186. See id. (citing H.R. 2517, 104th Cong. § 13631 (1995); H.R. 2491, 104th
Cong. § 13631 (1995)).
187. See id. (citing Key GOP Senators Back Indians Against Casino Tax, Aiuz. RE.
PuBuc, Oct. 11, 1995, at CL26).
188. See id. at 443.
189. SeeJulian Schriebman, Developments in Policy: Federal Indian Law, 14 YALE
L. & POL'Y REv. 353, 385 (1996) (citing S. 952, 104th Cong. (1995)).
190. See id.
191. See id. (quoting 141 CONG. Rc. S.8822, 8833 (daily ed. June 27, 1995)
(Remarks of Sen. Lieberman)).
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mine such regulations and the role that gaming would play in ob-
taining self-sufficiency of the tribe. 192 While this bill would seem to
recognize the need for poorer tribes to enter the gaming arena, the
problem is that the bill includes any commercial purpose other
than gaming. 193 The bill runs counter to any tradition behind the
United States' economic theory that would propose to punish a
tribe or any other organization or business from having past
successes.
V. CONCLUSION
There are two possibilities for the future of IGRA: (1) either
the states will continue to gain power and control over the regula-
tion of Indian gambling within its borders; or (2) the reservations
will be given additional freedoms and autonomy by the federal gov-
ernment and Congress from state intervention. If Seminole, Kelly,
Oneida, Crow, and Miami Tribe are any indication, Indian gaming
seems to be in jeopardy from growing state intrusions and regula-
tion. More importantly, Seminole, Kelly, Oneida, Crow, and Miami
Tribe transcend the gaming arena and signify that state sovereignty
currently outweighs fundamental concepts of tribal sovereignty.
However, if Congress and the courts protect the tribes, refrain from
interfering with Tribal-State compacts and allow the tribes without
interference to seek economic viability through gaming, IGRA will
continue to provide a limited window of opportunity for some
tribes to regain their economic independence and as a result, true
independent sovereignty.
William Bennett Cooper, III
192. See id.
193. See id. at 385.
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